

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400090036-1

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400090036-1

DCI-26
SIDE A
0 - 3

NOTE: Per DCI's instructions, [REDACTED]
listened to this tape Monday morning,
16 October 1978. He deemed it unnecessary
that it be typed in final.

25X1

16 OCT 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

25X1

This week I'd like to take on the situation of the Shah. My personal
reading is that the Shah is going down hill personally faster than we have

acknowledged in any of our reporting. The fact that he went into a state of near paralysis during the major riots and then recovered nicely but has quickly been thrown back into another state of shock by these latest disturbances leaves me to feel he is losing his grip. This doesn't mean he is going to be overthrown but that we are going to have more and more trouble because eventually his judgment and decisions won't be good. The fact that he is even thinking of changing his cabinet again this quickly is indicative that he is being pressed by events rather than in any way feeling he can control them. I'd like to have you try that theme on the analysts. I'd like you to ask them to write me not more than a two-page paper on the significance of the events in Iran in recent months for delivery when I get home tonight. What do they see as the long-term impact of the riots and the fact that the Shah has had to back down a good bit, change his priorities. Surely it will never be the same as it was before, but what does that mean.

Next it would be nice if we could say something about Lebanon. I don't have an intuition here. Perhaps my feeling is that we are building up to a possible crisis. The Iraqis may be mobilizing reserves. They are certainly moving forces to the west. They may have obtained permission from Syria to move them up to the borders with Israel. Clearly they are pushing hard to obtain a stronger position from which to cut down the Camp David accords. Syria in the meantime is acting in a more pliant manner in Lebanon, possibly because it feels this Iraqi pressure and the danger that it could get isolated if the Israeli-Egyptian thing moves along. In other words, they may be willing to cut their losses in Syria if they can do so while saving face in order to give more attention to the Israeli-Camp David issues, hoping thereby

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400090036-1

that they can scotch Camp David though not being as adamantly committed as the Iraqis. Hussein, on the other hand, resented the President's strong pressure to join in the Camp David process because he feels the United States doesn't recognize the precarious position he is in between the two forces I have just described and the high-speed momentum of Camp David. The two danger areas are the Christian militia in Lebanon that push things over the brink there and cause some outburst that could have lots of repercussions, but at the moment the tendency seems to be, for reasons I don't understand, for them to be willing to calm things down.


25X1

The other danger is that as a result of quick movement in Washington on the Camp David scene, there might be precipitant action elsewhere-- on the part of the Saudis, desperately wanting to keep the Arab from being split; on the part of the Iraqis, particularly if they do gain a military position on Israel's frontiers. It's hard for me to guess whether a quick signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel which could numb all the rest of the players and gain an inevitable momentum is the better course or whether that might snap some fragile situation

25X1

Finally, I have the feeling that there is movement going on behind the scenes on the Eritrean front. The Soviets are moving desperately to get some kind of negotiated agreement. They'd have to put more Cubans into Asmara. We don't know if it's in a fighting mode or just a holding and support action, but because they are being squeezed to support

Mengistu militarily more. They are pushing equally hard to get the problem resolved without them having to stay in the middle. The EPOF, being a Marxist front, are being worked the hardest and while they still demand a good position in Eritrea, it's not so strong that they are really opposed to negotiation.



25X1

25X1

STANSFIELD TURNER

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400090036-1

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400090036-1

THE WASHINGTON POST
13 September 1978

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1,9

Documents Found in Martin's Home, Car

Ex-Envoy's Possession of Secret Data Probed

By Laurence Stern
and John M. Goshko

Washington Post Staff Writers

The Justice Department is investigating the possession by former U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam Graham Martin of voluminous files of top-secret intelligence documents the FBI recovered last January from his home and automobile.

The documents, according to one knowledgeable official, include highly classified CIA communications between the former U.S. embassy in Saigon and Washington.

They cover the entire span of major U.S. involvement in the Vietnam con-

flict from 1963 to 1975. As one official put it, "hardly anyone who played an important role in the Vietnam drama" was omitted from the classified reports in Martin's possession. "It includes the entire time of our viceroyship in Vietnam," he said.

The Justice Department has been considering whether to prosecute Martin under a seldom-used statute dealing with the "misuse" of classified documents. Officials at the State Department could cite no evidence that Martin had permission to keep the documents, which are presumed to have been taken from the files of the Saigon embassy where he served from July 1973 until the American evacuation April 30, 1975.

Former CIA officer Frank Snepp, who wrote a highly critical book about his service in Vietnam, said in a phone interview last night that he had told the CIA and the Senate Intelligence Committee in 1977 that Martin took secret documents with him in the evacuation from Saigon.

"He told me he kept them so he could have the last word on [former secretary of state Henry A.] Kissinger," Snepp said.

None of the authorities he informed of Martin's actions expressed concern or interest in doing anything about the matter, Snepp added.

Martin, interviewed by telephone at a Winston-Salem, N.C., hospital where he is recovering from lung surgery, said he had intended to turn over the papers to the Lyndon B. Johnson Library in Austin, Tex.

"I thought the historians might be able to do a better job at telling the story than has been done so far. They should have a shot at it," said the former ambassador.

But Martin did not call the LBJ Library to volunteer his papers until several weeks after North Carolina State Police found a batch of documents stamped "top secret" in the trunk of his car and called the FBI in on the case. The accidental discovery was made by police in the course of recovering Martin's car after he reported it stolen.

The discovery of the large cache of highly secret documents was made by the state police last January when they found several cartons of papers both inside the car and scattered around it.

North Carolina law enforcement sources said several of the papers were scattered in the nearby woods, and some had been found by schoolchildren and used by them as scratch paper. In fact, the sources added, the police apparently were led to the stolen car by a tip from a teacher who found one of the documents in the hands of a pupil.

State and Justice Department officials familiar with the case said they had no knowledge of Martin's motives in keeping the documents, which are assumed to have been in his possession since the evacuation of the American embassy nearly 3½ years ago.

After the discovery, the documents were transferred to the Greensboro, N.C., office of the FBI. Martin says he also has retained some documents in his home which he intends to annotate and deliver to the LBJ Library. The former ambassador said he regards all the papers as his personal possessions.

In addition, Martin has told officials of the LBJ Library that his proposed gift includes a third category of documents that currently are being held in two security vaults at the State Department in Washington and that, according to Martin, are to be turned over to the library after joint screening by him and department officials.

Harry Middleton, director of the LBJ Library, said Martin contacted him last Feb. 13 and notified him of his decision to deposit papers in the archive. He said Martin told him of the circumstances of the car theft the preceding month and that the FBI had taken custody of portions of his proposed bequest.

Middleton said he was not aware that a criminal investigation was being conducted into Martin's possession of the documents. "We had been going on the assumption that the library would get the documents after the FBI, and I presumed the State Department made the necessary determinations about what we were entitled to receive."

State Department officials involved in the case said yesterday they had never heard in its eight-month history that Martin intended to bequeath the impounded documents to the LBJ Library.

Middleton said he prepared a deed of gift which Martin signed on Feb. 22. The LBJ Library director then forwarded it to James B. Rhoads, archivist of the United States in Washington. Rhoads, in turn, said he routinely accepted the transfer to the library—a procedure required in all such transfers to presidential libraries.

"Normally we leave it up to the directors of the presidential library involved to satisfy themselves that the gift is in order," Rhoads told The Washington Post last night. He added that he was unaware of any criminal investigation into the circumstances of the classified material. "Normally I don't get into that sort of thing unless there is some problem that is called to my attention and that requires checking," he said.

Justice, State and FBI spokesmen all declined to comment on the Martin affair.

It was learned, however, that the content of the find included some of the most sensitive documents that can pass through any embassy—back-channel CIA cables which bypass the State Department's traffic network and personnel, sometimes including the ambassador.

Unlike the cases of Frank Snepp and Daniel Ellsberg, central figure in the Pentagon Papers case, as well as other dissident former officials, there is no evidence that Martin intended to publish the classified material.

In the telephone interview yester-

CONTINUED

Tape 38

Side A, 3 1/2 - 3 7/8

16 OCT 1978

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR:



FROM:

DCI

Without causing any stir, I'd like quietly to find out how long the members
of the NIE 3/8 review panel I spoke with on Thursday have been on that ^{panel.} In short,
are we ~~I/we~~ getting the same people reviewing the same document all the time or is there
some *infusion of new talent.*

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400090036-1

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400090036-1